The platform half of chunk 2; the account-add UI is 2d, since it is a design
task and the piece that needs an on-device review.
A stub ContentProvider turned out to be required and was not in the plan: a
sync adapter registers against a content authority, and we publish no provider
since :provider was deleted. Without one there is nothing for contentAuthority
to name, nothing for requestSync to address, and hasAuthorityAccess() makes
every ContentResolver sync call a silent no-op at targetSdk 34+.
- CredentialStore: Keystore AES/GCM, blob in its own DataStore file.
security-crypto is formally deprecated and terminal. Decryption failure means
re-authenticate, never a crash — including ProviderException, which is a
RuntimeException and escapes the obvious catches.
- CalDavAccounts + SyncAuthenticator: no password reaches AccountManager, which
stores them as plain TEXT. The authenticator never returns null — a null is
the protocol for "answering asynchronously", and nothing here does, so
Settings would wait forever. addAccount refuses with a readable message until
2d ships the screen, rather than opening the home screen and hanging.
- SyncAdapterService: enqueue and wait on the unique work *name*, not the
request id — enqueueUniqueWork is async so the id is unknown when the wait
starts, and under KEEP it may never exist at all. Being deduplicated is not
a failure.
- Account type and authority are per build variant, so debug and release do
not fight over ownership. SyncContractTest guards the Kotlin/resValue pair.
- The credential blob is the only thing excluded from backup: Keystore keys are
non-exportable, so a restored ciphertext can never be decrypted.
Known trade-off recorded in network_security_config.xml and SYNC-PLAN.md: the
user CA store is trusted for all traffic, which chunk 5's cert4android should
replace rather than sit beside.
The instrumented tests here compile but have not been run — device work waits
for an explicit go-ahead.
makiolaj
ec50e0998c