The auth handler decided which hosts may receive the password by comparing the last two labels of their names. A server at cloud.example.co.uk therefore scoped the app password to co.uk, one at myhome.duckdns.org to duckdns.org, and a self-hoster at 192.168.1.10 to "any address ending .1.10". The handler sends Basic preemptively, before any challenge, so those hosts get the password unprompted on the first HTTPS request. It is reachable: ServiceDiscovery accepts an SRV target outside the domain it queried, over plain UDP DNS. Scoped correctly, an on-path attacker needs a certificate for a name inside the victim's own registrable domain. Scoped to co.uk, they need one for a domain they already own. Now topPrivateDomain(), from the list OkHttp bundles, falling back to the exact host where there is none -- null means no restriction here, so an IP literal or localhost must not pass one through. The handler had to change with the caller: it re-derives the domain per request, so fixing only the caller withholds the credential from everything. Still trusted: two hosts under one registrable domain share an owner. That is what iCloud's caldav/pNN-caldav split needs, and narrowing further costs it.
11 KiB
:dav — vendored dav4jvm
Upstream: bitfireAT/dav4jvm,
tag 2.2.1, commit f434c9d19b322228916c106beaebd8634b85ddb1.
Licence: MPL-2.0 (dav/LICENSE, verbatim). Every file keeps its upstream
header, as §3.4 requires. Agendula's own code is MIT and unaffected — MPL is
file-level copyleft, which is why this lives in its own module rather than
inside :app.
62 source files, ~4,200 lines, plus upstream's 15 test classes.
Why vendored, and why this version
docs/SYNC-PLAN.md decision 1 settled vendor rather than depend. dav4jvm is
published on JitPack only, which conflicts with our FAIL_ON_PROJECT_REPOS
policy, does not sign artifacts, and rebuilds on demand — so a coordinate is not
immutable. Upstream also shipped two breaking majors nineteen days apart
(3.0.0 on 2026-07-08, 4.0.0 on 2026-07-27).
2.2.1 is the last OkHttp release. 3.0.0 deleted the OkHttp package for Ktor,
and 4.x additionally requires Java 21 bytecode while we target 17 across
:app and all of floret-kit. Taking 4.x would mean Ktor (~2.45 MB), the wrong
guava flavour, and a Java-target migration — and it would invalidate the whole
auth design in docs/SYNC.md, which is written in OkHttp terms throughout
(preemptive Basic via an Interceptor, OkHttp stripping Authorization on
cross-host redirects, BasicDigestAuthHandler because OkHttp has no Digest).
Vendoring at 2.2.1 costs us upstream's later work and makes us responsible for this tree. What it buys: our own Java target, no JitPack, no Ktor tail, no xpp3 in the APK, and the freedom to fix the defects below rather than route around them.
This is a plain JVM module, not an Android library. The upstream tree has
zero Android imports and must not gain any: docs/SYNC.md earmarks this layer
for floret-kit's core-dav, and Calendula needs the same primitives, so
extraction should stay a file move.
Changes from upstream
Upstream's own test suite is vendored with the code and passes unmodified —
that is what makes these changes safe to make. Our additions live in
LocalChangesTest; every other test file is upstream's, untouched.
1. commons-lang3 removed
HttpUtils.kt imported org.apache.commons.lang3.time.DateUtils for exactly one
call — DateUtils.parseDate(str, locale, patterns…), a loop over format strings.
Replaced with that loop. The dependency is gone; the format list is byte-for-byte
upstream's, comments included.
⚠️ The loop is not the whole of what DateUtils did. It parsed with a
ParsePosition and rejected a pattern unless the entire string was consumed;
SimpleDateFormat.parse(String) accepts a prefix. Pattern 1 ends in the quoted
literal 'GMT', so "Wed, 21 Oct 2015 07:28:00 GMT+02:00" matches it as a
prefix and the offset is silently discarded — a two-hour error, and precisely the
failure change 2 exists to remove. The replacement requires full consumption.
2. ⚠️ HTTP dates were parsed and formatted in the device's local zone
An upstream defect, not a porting artefact. httpDateFormatStr is
"EEE, dd MMM yyyy HH:mm:ss 'GMT'" — the GMT is a quoted literal, so
SimpleDateFormat neither reads nor writes a zone from it, and
httpDateFormat never had timeZone set. So formatDate emitted local time
labelled GMT, and parseDate read 07:28:00 GMT as 07:28 local — every
getlastmodified out by the device's UTC offset, in whichever direction the
user happens to live.
Upstream's HttpUtilsTest covers only fileName() and never touches dates,
which is why this survived. Fixed by forcing GMT on the formatter and on every
parse attempt; patterns carrying a real z still take the zone from the input,
as they must. Covered by LocalChangesTest.
3. Permanent redirects now reach the caller (dav4jvm#209)
followRedirects mutated location in place for every 3xx and told the caller
nothing, so a caller could not distinguish "this resource has moved, store the
new URL" from "follow this once". DAVx5 consequently never rewrites a stored
collection URL after a 301 and re-follows it on every sync;
docs/SYNC.md names persisting the new URL ourselves as the fix.
Added DavResource.permanentLocation, set only along an unbroken chain of 301 /
308. A temporary hop ends the chain — 301 → 302 means the resource moved to the
301's target and is being served elsewhere for now, so persisting the 302's
target would be wrong. location still moves for every redirect, unchanged.
It is cleared at the start of every request, so it describes the request just
made and never one made earlier through the same object. DavResource instances
are reused, and a stale value would have the caller persist a URL that a later
move() already superseded.
4. xpp3 is compile-time only
Upstream declares org.ogce:xpp3 as api. Android ships org.xmlpull.v1 in the
framework, so the 371 KB jar is compileOnly here and never reaches the APK. The
unit tests run on a plain JVM, which has no framework, so they get the real
implementation via testImplementation.
5. httpDateFormat is no longer a shared mutable formatter
Upstream exposed a single public SimpleDateFormat. It is mutable and not
thread-safe: two workers formatting a header concurrently corrupt each other
through its Calendar, and any caller could setTimeZone on it and undo change 2
for everyone else. It is now private and built per call. Nothing else in the tree
referenced it.
6. <D:unauthenticated/> is parsed instead of inferred
CurrentUserPrincipal.Factory read only the <href> child, so an
unauthenticated body (RFC 5397 §3 — a 200 whose content means the request was
not authenticated) arrived as "property present, href null" — identical to a
conformant-but-empty element, and to a server that omits the property entirely.
A caller inferring rejection from the null href therefore also fires on merely
non-conformant servers, and on a request that carried no credential at all.
The factory now makes one pass over both children (XmlUtils.processTag consumes
to the end tag and so cannot be called twice) and reports unauthenticated
explicitly. Without it, a rejected credential is indistinguishable from a
successful discovery that found nothing.
Build integration
:dav's tests are a plain JVMtesttask. CI runstestDebugUnitTest, which exists only on Android variants, so.forgejo/workflows/ci.yamlnames:dav:testexplicitly. Without that the vendored suite is compiled by nobody and run by nobody, and the safety argument above is void.:appdeclarestestImplementation(libs.xpp3).compileOnlyis not transitive,:app's unit tests run on a plain JVM with no framework, andisReturnDefaultValues = truemakes android.jar's stub factory returnnull— so anything touchingXmlUtilswould fail with an unrelated-looking NPE.
What was not a defect
docs/SYNC.md lists two dav4jvm defects we would inherit. Only one of them
exists in this version:
- "Handles 301/302/307/308 but not 303" — does not hold for 2.2.1.
followRedirectsgates on OkHttp'sResponse.isRedirect, which includesHTTP_SEE_OTHER, and it re-sends the same method, which is what RFC 6764 §5 asks for during discovery. Pinned by a test so a future resync cannot lose it silently. dav4jvm#209— real, and fixed above as change 3.
Resyncing
Fetch the new tag, diff against f434c9d, reapply changes 1–4, run
./gradlew :dav:test. If upstream's suite fails, the port is wrong — that is the
entire reason it is vendored alongside the code.
Change 7 — a same-host HTTPS→HTTP redirect is upgraded, not refused
DavResource.followRedirects threw DavException("Received redirect from HTTPS to HTTP") for any downgrade. That is right for a redirect to a different host,
which has no innocent reading. It is wrong for the same host, and the same host
is the case that actually occurs.
⚠️ A Nextcloud behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy without
overwriteprotocol — or without proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme —
builds every redirect with http://. That includes the /.well-known/caldav
hop RFC 6764 discovery depends on. The server is entirely functional:
/remote.php/dav/ answers 401 over HTTPS exactly as it should. But discovery
refuses the downgrade, falls back to a PROPFIND on the web root, gets the 405
an ordinary web server returns, and reports "not a CalDAV server" about a working
CalDAV server.
Now: when the redirect target's host matches the current one, the scheme is put
back to https and the hop continues. Re-issuing the same host and path over TLS
is strictly safer than obeying the redirect as sent, and it preserves the
invariant that matters — credentials never travel in cleartext. A cross-host
downgrade still throws.
Found against a real server, not by reading: cloud.jeanlucmakiola.de returns
301 → http://cloud.jeanlucmakiola.de/remote.php/dav/.
Change 8 — the credential is scoped by the public-suffix list, not by a label split
BasicDigestAuthHandler gated every request on
domain.equals(UrlUtils.hostToDomain(request host)), and hostToDomain is a
pure last-two-labels split with no public-suffix knowledge. So a server at
cloud.example.co.uk scoped the credential to co.uk, one at
myhome.duckdns.org to duckdns.org, and a self-hoster at 192.168.1.10 to
1.10.
⚠️ The handler adds Authorization: Basic preemptively, before any
challenge, to the first HTTPS request to any host that passes that gate. So the
scope is not merely recorded — it is the set of hosts that receive the app
password unprompted.
That is reachable. ServiceDiscovery builds candidate origins from SRV targets
without requiring the target to lie inside the queried domain, over plain UDP
DNS with no DNSSEC. Correct scoping forces an on-path attacker to obtain a
certificate for a name inside the victim's own registrable domain, which is
infeasible; co.uk scoping lets them point the SRV at a domain they own and
hold a legitimate certificate for.
Now: request.url.topPrivateDomain() ?: request.url.host. OkHttp bundles the
public-suffix list including its private section, so the dynamic-DNS providers
self-hosters actually use are covered. topPrivateDomain() is null for an IP
literal, a single-label host, and a host that is a public suffix — and null
means no restriction to this handler, so it falls back to the exact host.
The caller must derive the scope the same way, which is why
CalDavHttp.authenticated changed with it: a mismatch withholds the credential
from every request rather than leaking it.
UrlUtils.hostToDomain and its test are left alone — after this it has no
production callers, and keeping it keeps the resync diff small.